Loper Bright v. Raimondo: Chevron overruled, courts decide for themselves what immigration statutes meanLoper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)

Wang Law Firm, LLC · David Wang, Managing Attorney · Attorney-reviewed · Updated October 2026

The case at a glance

Background: what Chevron deference was

The 1984 Chevron case set out a two-step framework: first, ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question; if so, follow Congress. Second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court must accept the responsible agency's interpretation as long as it is "reasonable," even if the court itself thinks another reading is better.

Chevron had an especially large impact on immigration law. In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre (1999), the Supreme Court held that the BIA's interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) through case-by-case adjudication are entitled to Chevron deference. For decades afterward, in many disputes over legal concepts such as "aggravated felony," "crime involving moral turpitude" and "exceptional hardship," the federal courts of appeals deferred to the BIA's interpretations under the Chevron framework.

Facts

The case itself had nothing to do with immigration. Atlantic herring fishing businesses challenged a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule requiring some vessels to carry federal observers and requiring the fishermen to pay for those observers. The fishermen argued that the fisheries statute did not authorize the agency to make them bear this cost. The D.C. Circuit (Loper Bright) and the First Circuit (Relentless) both deferred to the agency's interpretation under Chevron and upheld the rule. When the Supreme Court granted review, it expressly took up the question whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.

Issues

1. When a statute does not clearly address a question, must courts defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation?
2. If not, how should courts treat agency interpretations and past decisions that relied on Chevron?

How the Court ruled

Majority opinion

The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to decide "all relevant questions of law," and that Chevron, by having courts set aside their own judgment and accept the agency's interpretation when a statute is ambiguous, is inconsistent with the APA. The opinion states:

"Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires."

The majority also made the following points:

• Agency interpretations can still inform the court: under the standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944), courts may give an agency's interpretation respect commensurate with the thoroughness of its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later positions, and similar factors. An agency's interpretation has the "power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
• Express delegations of discretion from Congress are still respected: if a statute itself expressly gives an agency discretion or the authority to define a term, the court's task is to fix the boundaries of that delegation and ensure that the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking within them.
• Prior decisions are not automatically invalidated: the majority wrote that "we do not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework"; the holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful remain subject to statutory stare decisis. Mere reliance on Chevron is not, on its own, a special justification for overruling such a holding.

Dissent

Justice Kagan's dissent argued that Chevron reflected a presumption that Congress implicitly leaves ambiguities to expert, politically accountable agencies; overruling it hands a large volume of technical and policy judgments to courts and creates uncertainty for those who rely on existing rules.

What this means for immigration law

Courts no longer must defer to BIA and USCIS legal interpretations

• In immigration court and BIA cases where the dispute is about the meaning of a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (for example, whether an offense is a particular kind of removable offense, or how a deadline is calculated), once the case reaches a federal circuit court on appeal, the court must determine the provision's best meaning itself, rather than adopting the BIA's interpretation wholesale because it is "reasonable."
• USCIS interpretations of statutory provisions (for example, how the Policy Manual reads a statutory standard) likewise no longer receive automatic deference in federal court litigation.
• BIA and USCIS interpretations still carry weight: thoroughly reasoned, long-consistent interpretations may earn judicial respect under the Skidmore standard.

What has not changed

• Fact-finding: the standard for reviewing immigration judges' findings of fact has not changed and remains highly deferential.
• Discretion expressly granted by statute: matters the INA commits to the "discretion" of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security remain within agency discretion; for many discretionary decisions, the statute itself also limits judicial review (see Patel v. Garland).
• Agency interpretations of their own regulations: Loper Bright concerns the interpretation of statutes. When an agency interprets its own regulations, a different set of rules applies (Auer/Kisor), which this case did not overrule.
• Prior decisions: immigration decisions the circuits issued in reliance on Chevron are not automatically invalidated by this case.

Later developments: application in immigration cases

The following are some examples of federal courts applying Loper Bright in immigration cases (as of October 2026); they show that courts' approaches are not uniform:

• Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032 (9th Cir., September 2024): concerned whether a petty theft conviction in Reno, Nevada is a "crime involving moral turpitude." The panel no longer applied Chevron, but evaluated the BIA's interpretation in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga under the Skidmore standard, found it correct and adopted it. Judge Sanchez dissented in part. On August 25, 2025, the Ninth Circuit (the case then captioned Lopez v. Bondi) denied rehearing en banc; Judge Bumatay dissented (joined by Judge Ikuta), criticizing the panel for nominally applying Skidmore while in effect giving the same result as Chevron deference.
• Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland (6th Cir., No. 23-3561, December 23, 2024): concerned the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents. The majority opinion by Judge Thapar held that deference is possible only when a statute expressly delegates discretion to the agency, and INA 240A(b)(1)(D) contains no such delegation, so the BIA cannot define the standard on its own; after interpreting it independently, the court still denied the petition for review. Judge Stranch concurred in the judgment and wrote separately. For the related form, see EOIR-42B.
• Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi (2d Cir., No. 23-6584, March 7, 2025): concerned whether a notice to appear lacking the hearing time and place deprives the immigration court of jurisdiction. The court said that although it can no longer defer to the BIA's view of the nature of the relevant provision, its earlier decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr rested on its own reading of the statute rather than on deference to the agency, and so is unaffected by Loper Bright; after independent analysis, the court agreed with the BIA that the requirement is not jurisdictional. For background, see Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland.
• Mukherji v. Miller (D. Neb., 2026): concerned USCIS's "final merits determination" in an EB-1A extraordinary ability petition. Reportedly, the court found USCIS's approach improper and set aside the denial, citing Loper Bright in its reasoning; also reportedly, USCIS later withdrew its appeal. This page was unable to obtain the decision text to verify each point; rely on the court docket for these details. This is a single district court decision and is not binding on other applicants. For background, see Kazarian v. USCIS.

Overall, Loper Bright changed how courts review agency interpretations, but in many immigration cases the courts, after independent analysis, have reached the same conclusion as the BIA. It is better seen as giving applicants a new argument for challenging an agency's legal interpretation than as a tool that automatically changes outcomes.

In addition, in Wilkinson v. Garland (2024), the Supreme Court held that applying the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard to established facts is a mixed question that courts may review; together with Loper Bright, this has expanded the room for substantive review of immigration cases in federal court.

Practical tips

• Preserve legal arguments in immigration court and before the BIA: if the case turns on the interpretation of a statutory provision, raise and argue it early, so it is not lost on appeal for failure to raise it.
• Check your circuit's precedent first: Loper Bright does not automatically overrule prior decisions, and binding precedent in your circuit must still be followed; there is room to challenge it only where you can show the earlier decision merely relied on Chevron without independently interpreting the statute.
• Distinguish legal interpretation from facts and discretion: Loper Bright affects only questions of statutory interpretation; it offers limited help with findings of fact or discretion expressly granted by statute.
• Federal litigation after a USCIS denial: for denials based on the Policy Manual rather than the statutory text, consider whether to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act and argue Loper Bright; but litigation takes time and its outcome is uncertain, so weigh it carefully.

Frequently asked questions

Decision text and sources

• Cornell Law School LII: full text of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
• U.S. Supreme Court: docket No. 22-451
• Ninth Circuit: Lopez v. Bondi order denying rehearing en banc (August 25, 2025, PDF)
• Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland opinion (Sixth Circuit, PDF, as reproduced by the State Bar of Michigan)
• Second Circuit: Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi opinion (PDF)

Related reading

• Wilkinson v. Garland: applying the hardship standard is reviewable on appeal
• Kazarian v. USCIS: the EB-1A two-step review
• Innova Solutions v. Baran: H-1B specialty occupation determinations
• Washtech v. DHS: the legal basis for OPT
• Immigration litigation tracker

This page is a general introduction to a court decision and is not legal advice. The law and case law change, and outcomes depend on the specific facts. To evaluate your situation, consult an attorney.